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Abstract. We develop an improvement to the weak laser pulse BB84 scheme for
quantum key distribution, which utilizes entanglement to improve the security of
the scheme and enhance its resilience to the photon-number-splitting attack. This
protocol relies on the non-commutation of phase and number to detect an eavesdropper
performing quantum non-demolition measurement on photon number. The potential
advantages and disadvantages of this scheme are compared to the coherent decoy state
protocol.
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1. Introduction
Quantum key distribution is rapidly emerging as an elegant application of quantum
information theory with immense practical value. The advent of quantum computing
compromises classical encryption schemes which are dependent on computational
difficulty for security. Fortunately, quantum information theory solves the exact problem
it creates. If a transmitter, Alice, wants to exchange a message with a receiver, Bob,
then the fundamental principles of quantum mechanics allow them to generate a key
that cannot be obtained by an eavesdropper, Eve [1-3].
In the theoretic framework of BB84, Alice sends a sequence of single photon pulses
to Bob. These photons are prepared in randomly chosen orthogonal bases. In the
receiving lab, Bob has two bases in which to measure the photon and randomly alternates
between them. If Eve tries measuring Alice’s photon and then sending the result of her
measurement to Bob, the eavesdropper will introduce errors into the key, since she does
not know in which basis the photon is being sent nor does she know in which basis
Bob will measure. Alice and Bob can then use these errors to detect the eavesdropper’s
presence and determine the security of the key [4].
However, in many experimental settings, Alice does not have a true single photon
source, so she sends weak laser pulses (WLP) instead. This coherent light photon
number probability follows a Poisson distribution. The probability of a pulse containing
n photons is
Pn =
µn
n!eµ
(1)
where µ is the mean photon number which will be taken to be a positive number less
than one to avoid pulses with more than one photon. However, multiple photon pulses
will still occur with probability PM = 1 − e
−µ − µe−µ. This exposes the scheme to the
photon number splitting (PNS) attack.
To perform the PNS attack, Eve replaces the high loss channel that Alice and Bob
are using with a lossless channel. Eve then performs a quantum non-demolition (QND)
measurement on each pulse to obtain number information without perturbing the bases
in which the information is encoded. When she determines a pulse with a single photon
is in the line, Eve simulates the loss of the original line by blocking a fraction of these
pulses. When Eve observes a pulse that has multiple photons, she splits the pulse and
stores a photon in a quantum memory. Eve then sends the rest of the pulse to Bob.
After Alice and Bob perform public discussion and announce the bases used for each
pulse, Eve can retrieve the photons from her quantum memory and obtain a significant
fraction of the key without being detected by Alice and Bob [5-9].
In general, all losses must be attributed to eavesdropping and privacy amplification
methods are used to distill a smaller secret key from the raw key generated via the BB84
protocol. In single photon BB84, the distilled secure key rate has approximately linear
dependence on the transmittivity. However, for WLP BB84, the PNS attack reduces the
secure key rate to approximately quadratic dependence on the channel’s transmittivity
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Figure 1. In the entanglement ancilla, for each photon pair generated by Alice, one is
detected in her lab to obtain time information. The other is sent into a beamsplitter
and then recombined at a second beamsplitter in the lab to create a pulse with halves
that have a time delay that results from a length difference in the paths between the
two beamsplitters. This pulse is then sent through the channel to Bob, who passes the
pulse through two beamsplitters in his lab that have path differences identical to those
in Alice’s lab.
[10]. In a typical high loss situation, this presents a major problem for the key rate.
One solution is to use coherent decoy states, a technique which has met with multiple
experimental successes [11-18]. Another alternative is to use entanglement to effectively
trump Eve’s use of the PNS attack. This is the impetus for the development of our
entanglement enhanced scheme for BB84. For convenience and clarity, we will refer to
this entanglement enhanced WLP BB84 as EE BB84.
Most entanglement based quantum key distribution schemes rely on violations of
Bell’s inequalities to ensure security [19]. However, this is not the strategy that our EE
BB84 employs here. Instead, we detect Eve by introducing an entangled quantum state
into the system that is not used to transmit key bits but only to detect Eve’s QND
measurements. In figure 1 we schematically illustrate how such an entanglement ancilla
may be generated. This allows for a recovery of an approximately linear dependence
on transmittivity for the key rate. EE BB84 shares this advantage with coherent decoy
state protocols as well as schemes that utilize strong phase reference pulses to eliminate
Eve’s ability to send Bob vacuum signals [10].
2. EE BB84 Scheme
In our EE BB84, Alice and Bob randomly alternate between implementing WLP BB84
and an entangled decoy state ancilla. The entangled states are not primarily used
to distribute key bits. Instead, Alice and Bob use the entangled states to detect the
presence of an eavesdropper. Alice sends the entangled pulses randomly mixed with the
weak laser pulses to guard against the use of a QND measurement device. When Eve
measures photon number in the PNS attack on unaugmented WLP BB84, she avoids
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Figure 2. Possible paths a photon can take to get from Alice to Bob’s detector:
short-short (SS), long-long (LL), short-long (SL), and long-short (LS). Alice’s time
information allows the SL and LS paths, which are indistinguishable from each other
to be distinguished from both SS and LL.
detection. The QND measurement collapses the coherent state into a number state,
which Bob cannot distinguish from the coherent state. This is related to the fact that
the number operator commutes with the prepared bases. However, phase and number
do not commute, as they are conjugate variables. Therefore, Alice and Bob can use the
phase information provided by phase entangled decoy states to detect Eve whenever she
chooses an attack scheme that involves measuring number.
In the entangled state mode, we generate two time-entangled photons using
spontaneous parametric down conversion (SPDC). Alice measures one photon in the
pair to obtain an accurate time of emission for the other photon. This combination
of pump laser, SPDC, and detection of one of the pair of photons gives us a heralded
single photon source. As in BB84, the heralded photon is randomly assigned either a
horizontal, vertical, diagonal, or anti-diagonal polarization. Then, the heralded photon
is sent to a beam splitter which leads to the state |Ψ〉 = 1√
2
(|10〉 + |01〉). Half of the
state travels down the longer arm, while the other half travels down the shorter arm.
The halves recombine at the second beam splitter where there is a probability for the
state to leave the quantum channel (see figure 1). A detector will distinguish these
possibilities and allows them to be ignored. However, when the pulse does exit into the
quantum channel, it is an entangled pulse, where half is delayed in time due to extra
path length of the long arm.
When Bob receives the test pulse from Alice in his lab, he detects the pulse by
sending it through a beam splitter which puts the pulse through long and short arms
identical to the setup in Alice’s lab. The pulse then encounters the final beam splitter.
In this process, there are three possibilities for the pulse. The strong time information
from the photon initially detected by Alice allows for the differentiation between these
three outcomes. One possibility is that the photon takes the short path both times,
labeled SS in figure 2. Another outcome is that the photon takes the long path both
times, labeled as LL. These two possibilities do not yield strong information about Eve’s
activities. However, the other possibility is that the photon travels down one long path
and one short path, labeled LS or SL. This possibility can detect the use of a quantum
non-demolition measurement device [20]. The photon’s self-interference will result in
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a bright port and a dark port in Bob’s detection apparatus. Yet, if Eve is measuring
number for the PNS attack, then Bob’s dark port will not be completely dark. Obviously,
it will not be completely dark even without an eavesdropper, since a practical system
will have imperfections and not identically match the ideal case. Nevertheless, Eve’s
actions will still introduce additional error, which can be used to detect her presence.
In our setup, Bob’s detection scheme for the entangled pulses is different from his
detection scheme for the signal states. This is less than ideal, because if the mode that
Alice and Bob are operating in at any given time is not random, then the security of
the entire protocol is compromised. If Eve can predict whether a signal state or a decoy
state is being sent, then she can adjust her attack plan accordingly and render the
entangled states useless. Therefore, it is critical that Eve cannot distinguish between
the entangled states and the signal states. Additionally, Alice and Bob must randomly
alternate between the signal and decoy modes. Felicitously, the decoy mode does not
need to be run with very high frequency in order to detect the use of a quantum non-
demolition attack. Nevertheless, since Alice and Bob must each run separate modes
for the signal states and the decoy states, a fraction of the pulses they exchange will
be worthless. Alice and Bob runs WLP BB84 protocol with frequencies fSA and fSB
respectively. They implement the entangled state decoy ancilla with frequencies fDA
and fDB. Alice and Bob exchange key information with frequency fSAfSB + fDAfSB,
and the entangled decoy pulses yield information about the presence of a quantum
non-demolition measurement device with frequency fDAfDB. With frequency fSAfDB,
Alice and Bob are operating in incompatible modes, and these exchanges will provide
no valuable information, because Bob does not obtain polarization information when
measuring phase. Since fSA and fSB are much larger than fDA and fDB, this inefficiency
is undesirable, but ultimately does not significantly diminish the practicality of the
scheme. Nevertheless, it is also indicative of the trade-off in quantum cryptography
between speed and security.
3. Symmetric Hypothesis testing and the Chernoff Distance
We use Chernoff distance [21] and symmetric hypothesis testing to calculate the
confidence in which Eve is known to be listening or not listening [22]. For EE BB84 the
null hypothesis is that Eve is not measuring number using a QND measurement device,
and the alternative hypothesis is that Eve is using such a device to measure number.
For the null hypothesis, the probability that the photon will enter the bright port is p,
and there is p = 1 − p probability for the photon to enter the dark port. When Eve
is acting on the system in the alternative hypothesis, there is a probability q for the
photon to enter Bob’s light port and a probability p = 1 − p for it to enter the dark
port. Furthermore, the maximum probability PMaxError of a false positive or of choosing the
wrong hypothesis after n trials is:
PMaxError =
1
2
e−nC(p,q) (2)
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where C(p, q) is the Chernoff distance given by the equation:
C(p, q) = ξln(
ξ
p
) + ξln(
ξ
p
) (3)
where ξ =
ln( q
p
)
ln(p
p
)+ln( q
q
)
and ξ = 1− ξ.
We use equations 2 and 3 to calculate the number of trials needed for a given
maximum uncertainty PMaxError:
n =
−ln(2PMaxError)
C(p, q)
. (4)
This analysis determines the number of trials necessary for a given confidence of
detecting an eavesdropper for EE BB84 and coherent decoy states.
4. EE BB84 Statistical Analysis
In an ideal scenario, with no dephasing from the environment, we can easily construct
the probabilities of the two hypotheses. For the null hypothesis, the probability that
the photon will enter the bright port is p = 1, and there is p = 1− p = 0 probability for
the photon to enter the dark port. When Eve is acting on the system in the alternative
hypothesis, there is an equal probability, q = q = 1
2
, for the photon to enter either of
Bob’s detectors. This results in a Chernoff distance of .69. Therefore, if we define a
trial to be a photon sent from Alice and detected by Bob, the number of trials to detect
Eve at the 99% confidence level (PMaxError = 0.01) requires an exchange of a maximum of
just 6 photons between Alice and Bob.
We are only investigating the photons that reach Bob with the proper time
information. Thus, unlike the coherent decoy states, loss is not the most significant
quantity to investigate quantitatively. Instead, dephasing is our primary concern. The
environment can affect the entangled decoy state by changing the phase information
in it. Since the two states are sent down the line close together, it might be assumed
that any environmental factor that would affect one half of the state, would affect the
other and therefore the total phase information in the state would remain unchanged.
However, since in our framework, dephasing is what would affect the scheme the most,
we still want to investigate its effect on the Chernoff distance.
When dephasing is included, the problem turns into that of determining whether
a coin is fair. The question becomes: how many trials does it take to be confident that
Eve is there or not? When dephasing is present, the probability for a photon to be
detected in the dark port increases. It becomes more difficult to tell Eve apart from the
environment. With complete dephasing the probability to find a photon in either the
bright port or the dark port becomes 50-50. Figure 3 shows how many trials are needed
to have a 99% confidence of determining if Eve is listening or not versus the probability
of finding a photon in the dark port (dephasing) regardless of Eve.
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Figure 3. Dephasing can be caused by the environment, an eavesdropper or both.
As the dephasing increases, the probability of finding a photon in the dark port
increases. This causes the number of trials needed to detect an eavesdropper with
a 99% confidence to increase. When the probability of detecting a photon at the light
and dark port is equal, it becomes impossible to tell an eavesdropper apart from the
environment.
5. Coherent Decoy States Statistical Analysis
The alternative to EE BB84 is the popular coherent decoy state solution. In the
PNS attack, Eve assumes Alice’s photon source has a constant mean photon number.
However, if Alice randomly alters the mean photon number of her source in a way that
is known to her, but not perceivable to Eve, then she can detect the PNS attack. This
is the idea that motivates coherent decoy states. Pulses from the source with a higher
mean photon number will contain a greater fraction of multi-photon pulses, which Eve
will not block. Therefore, when Alice and Bob discuss the protocol, Alice can compare
the loss in the line for when different mean photon numbers were used. If there is a
marked difference between the loss for the decoy states and the loss for the signal states,
then Alice can conclude that Eve is using the photon number splitting attack [22-26].
We treat coherent decoy states in a similar manner to EE BB84, but instead
of dephasing being the key quantity of interest, loss is, because Eve hides in the
loss of the system. The coherent decoy state solution uses two (or more) attenuated
coherent sources with different average photon numbers n¯1 and n¯2. Alice determines
the percentage of each of these states that is sent down the channel. If Alice sends Bob
a total of 100 pulses, of which 70 (70%) have an average photon number of n¯1 and 30
(30%) have n¯2 and we assume a loss of 50%, then Bob should receive 35 (70%) pulses
with an average photon number of n¯1 and 15 (30%) with n¯2. In this scenario, we define
loss as losing the whole pulse. Loss affects the total number of photons received, but not
the percentage of n¯1 and n¯2. Eve performs a PNS attack by replacing all or part of the
lossy transmission line with a lossless line and altering the percentage of n¯1 and n¯2 sent
through to Bob. In this example we assume Eve has replaced the entire transmission
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line with a lossless one. Eve sits on the line and measures number until she finds a pulse
containing more than one photon and then she takes one of these photons and lets the
other pass. She blocks enough of the single photon pulses such that the initial loss is
preserved. If n¯1 < n¯2, The n¯2 pulse will have more photons on average than the other
and therefore will be allowed to pass through to Eve more than the other. So, in the
presence of Eve, if Alice sends 100 pulses, of which 70 (70%) have an average photon
number of n¯1 and 30 (30%) have n¯2 and we assume a loss of 50% which Eve will take
over, then Bob would still receive a total of 50 pulses, but the percentages of n¯1 pulses
will be less than 30% and the percentage of n¯2 pulses will be greater than 70%, which is
not identical to what Alice sent. Here, we are looking at the very worst possible case of
eavesdropping. We are assuming that Eve has replaced all of the noise with a noiseless
channel.
Alice looks at the percentage of n¯1 and n¯2 received by Bob and compares it to the
percentages she sent. If she can tell the difference between them with an acceptable
confidence, then Eve is detected. This is treated in the same way we treated EE BB84
above. The Chernoff distance will give us a metric to determine the presence of Eve and
the number of pulses needed to be 99% confident of the presence of an eavesdropper is
given in figure 4. The efficiency of coherent decoy states improves as loss rises because
it gives Eve more space to sift the photons, but as the loss becomes too high, then
obviously transmission becomes difficult for any scheme.
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Figure 4. The solid line is the number of pulses sent by Alice (not necesarily detected
by Bob) for the coherent decoy state scheme to detect an eavesdropper with a 99%
confidence. The dotted and dashed lines are for the EE BB84 scheme at 10% and
30% dephasing respectively. For cases of very high loss, decoy states outperform EE
BB84. However, for more moderate levels of loss, EE BB84 requires fewer pulses to
confidently detect the presence of an eavesdropper compared to coherent decoy states.
6. Conclusion
The crux of the coherent decoy state solution is that Eve manipulates photon number
statistics in a way that Alice can detect. However, if Eve can gain information, which
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allows her to not alter the statistics in a detectable manner, then the coherent decoy
state technique will not be a successful solution. This situation would obviously justify
the implementation of EE B84, yet EE BB84 is advantageous in some other scenarios
as well.
The parameters and performance of EE BB84 and coherent decoy states can vary
greatly depending on environment and choice of variables. For the examples in figure 4,
the coherent decoy state parameters were chosen such that the percentage of n¯1 pulses
is 70% and the percentage of n¯2 pulses is 30%, and the dephasing for the EE BB84
scheme was set to 10% and 30% for the two lines respectively. It can be seen that for
loss of less than 75% and dephasing less than 10% the EE BB84 scheme outperforms
the coherent decoy state scheme by requiring fewer pulses. At 50% loss the EE BB84
scheme would need to send about a third the number of pulses as the coherent decoy
state to detect an eavesdropper with 99% confidence.
Coherent decoy states are a popular solution to the photon number splitting attack
for a reason. They achieve linear scaling with transmittivity. Additionally, coherent
decoy states can be used to distill a secret key without Bob alternating detection modes.
However, in EE BB84, Bob must alternate between a polarization detection mode and a
phase detection. This gives coherent decoy states an advantage over the present version
of EE BB84.
At the moment, EE BB84 does not possess general superiority to coherent decoy
states. Therefore, the appeal of EE BB84 is that it has some situational advantages and
approaches the problem of the photon number splitting attack in a manner strategically
different from that of coherent decoy states. The general strategy of coherent decoy
states is to improve the secret key transmission rate by focusing on limiting the amount
of information that Eve can possibly obtain while still avoiding detection. Meanwhile,
the strategy behind EE BB84 is direct detection of an eavesdropper that might be
performing quantum non-demolition measurements. The strategy of EE BB84 is not
superior to that of coherent decoy states. It is simply different, and this difference helps
generate situations where the EE BB84 scheme has specific advantages, like the case
when the operation time for the key transmission is not long enough for decoy states
to be a robust defense. In cases such as this, EE BB84 has an advantage because of
its ability to determine the use of quantum non-demolition measurement with a rather
meager number of pulses.
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